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Introduction
Although the demise of Bretton Woods freed countries from the rigidities of maintaining
exchange-rate parities, no country (or alliance) has allowed market forces free reign in
determining its exchange rates.  Even prime candidates for floating, like Canada, the European
Monetary Union, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, occasionally have altered
their monetary policies, or have bought and sold foreign-exchange in an attempt to affect the
exchange value of their currencies.  Last summer, for example, the European Central Bank
undertook coordinated interventions with Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States in an
effort to stem a depreciation of the euro against the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.
Economists have long cautioned against these exercises.  When a country’s central bank
maintains an unchanged interbank rate as the intermediate operating target for its monetary
policy, it automatically offsets (or sterilizes) the impact of any exchange-market intervention on
its monetary base.  Sterilized intervention will generally prove incapable of altering exchange
rates.  If, instead, the central bank alters the target interest rate, it creates the potential for conflict
between price and exchange-rate stability.  Only when the disturbance that initiates the central
bank’s response is domestic in origin and monetary in nature, can monetary policy achieve both
price and exchange-rate stability.  Ironically, however, transacting in foreign currencies is
unnecessary in this circumstance, since conventional open-market operations are altogether
sufficient.
The subsequent sections of this chapter illustrate each of these points in turn.  Overall, we
hope to demonstrate the near futility of exchange market intervention.
Intervention and the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet
The central banks of most large industrial countries automatically sterilize all exchange-
market interventions, whether undertaken for their own accounts or for the accounts of other2
government agencies, like the Ministry of Finance or the Treasury.
1  The Federal Reserve’s
operating procedure illustrates the mechanism.
In the United States, the Treasury has broad statutory responsibility for determining the
nation’s exchange rate system.  Under that authority it maintains the Exchange Stabilization
Fund—a portfolio of foreign-currency, and dollar-denominated, assets—for intervention purpose.
The Federal Reserve, the independent monetary authority, has a separate portfolio of foreign
exchange for the same purpose.  Usually, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury intervene in
concert.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) acts as agent for both agencies and
splits the proceeds of the transactions evenly between the two accounts.  The FRBNY may
transact directly with commercial banks or, using a commercial bank as its agent, with a foreign
exchange broker.  In either case, the FRBNY makes or accepts payment in dollars by crediting or
debiting the reserve account of the appropriate commercial bank(s), as it would in a standard
open-market transaction.
The Federal Reserve’s portion of a U.S. intervention has the potential (other things being
held constant) to drain or add bank reserves, customarily with a two-day lag.
2  The Treasury’s
actions affect bank reserves only if the Treasury’s cash balances at the Federal Reserve change.
3
In either case, the Federal Reserve never allows intervention to affect its monetary policy
operations; it always sterilizes.
4
Sterilization occurs automatically by virtue of the Federal Reserve’s operating procedure.
The FRBNY’s Open Market Desk manages total reserves in the U.S. banking system in such a
way as to achieve the federal funds target that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
establishes in its monetary-policy deliberations.  The FOMC actions are almost always taken with
                                                
1  We define foreign-exchange-market intervention as purchases and sales of foreign exchange for the purpose of
influencing exchange rates.   This definition distinguishes foreign-exchange-market intervention from other policy
actions, most notably open-market operations in domestic securities, that might also affect exchange rates.
2  The two-day lag reflects the customary practices for concluding foreign-exchange transactions.
3  For a more complete explanation under alternative means of financing an intervention, see Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at [http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/addpub/monpol/].3
domestic objectives—inflation, business-cycle developments, financial fragility—in mind.  Given
its estimate of depository institutions’ demand for total reserves, the Desk manages the supply of
reserves through open-market operations to keep the actual federal funds rate at the target.  In the
process, the Desk must take account of a number of factors that appear on the Federal Reserve’s
balance sheet and that can affect the amount of reserves in the banking system at any time.
Among these items are changes in the Treasury’s cash balances and changes in the Federal
Reserve’s portfolio of foreign exchange.  The Federal Reserve staff will attempt to estimate these
on a day-to-day basis, but whether anticipated or not, the Fed will respond to them quickly in
defense of the federal funds target.  Consequently, intervention is never permitted to change
reserves in a manner that is inconsistent with the day-to-day maintenance of the federal fund rate
target.  All central banks, including the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, that use an
overnight, reserve-market interest rate as a short-term operating target necessarily sterilize their
interventions in this way.
Sterilized Intervention
The consensus of empirical research over the past twenty or so years holds that sterilized
intervention is largely ineffective (see Edison 1993, Almekinder 1995 and Baillie et al. 2000).  It
may from time to time affect exchange rates, but its influence is unpredictable and small.  To
appreciate this finding, one must understand how sterilized intervention might influence exchange
markets.
Sterilized intervention does not directly affect fundamental economic determinants of
exchange rates, but it occasionally seems to influence market perceptions and expectations of
those fundamentals.  If information is costly, exchange rates cannot continuously reflect all
available information.  Access to costly information will differentiate traders, and each will
incorporate information only to the point at which the expected marginal benefits from acquiring
                                                                                                                                                
4  If the Federal Reserve did not routinely sterilize all interventions, the U.S. Treasury could affect the money supply
through its purchases and sales of foreign exchange.  This might compromise the Federal Reserve’s independence.4
and trading on information equals his or her marginal costs.  A substantial literature seems to
confirm that exchange markets are not perfectly efficient processors of information, even publicly
available information.  We cite three examples:  Ito (1993) finds that expectations, as revealed in
survey data, are not homogeneous, suggesting that traders have asymmetric information sets.
Peiers (1997) finds evidence in the pattern of exchange-rate quotes following a Bundesbank
intervention that is consistent with insider information and price leadership.  Neely et al. (1997)
demonstrate that ex ante trading rules generate profits, a finding that is not consistent with
informationally efficient markets along the lines presented in Fama (1970).  In such a market,
exchange rates perform a dual role of describing the terms of trade between national currencies
and transferring information from more to less informed agents.
5  If monetary authorities have
better information than the market and if they can convey that information through their official
actions, sterilized intervention could influence exchange rates.
Taking a cue from Mussa (1981), some economists contend that central banks have better
information about future monetary-policy changes than the market and might signal those
changes (intentionally or unintentionally) through their currency transactions.  Such signals could
be particularly credible, since intervention would give monetary authorities an exposure to a
foreign currency that would result in a loss if they failed to validate them.  (Of course, a validated
intervention signal would no longer be sterilized!)  As a general description of the informational
effects of intervention, this view lacks compelling empirical support.  Compare, for example,
Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) who find some support for the proposition, and Fatama and Hutchison
(1999), who find no support (see the references listed therein).  As an explanation of certain
episodes, however, this view may have some merit.  Humpage (2000) suggests that successful
interventions are more likely during periods of monetary uncertainty.
To the extent that this view does have merit, however, it is a two-edged sword.  For
example, the Federal Reserve System’s euro purchases on September 22, 2000 seemed
                                                
5  Baillie, Humpage, and Osterberg (2000) survey intervention from an information perspective.5
inconsistent with the increases that it authorized in the federal funds target between June 1999
and May 2000.  We doubt that any FOMC member viewed these interventions as an expression
of future ease.  The Federal Reserve did not ease policy until January 2001, well after the euro-
dollar exchange rate was a pressing issue.  Similarly, intervention in late 1980s and early 1990s
often conflicted with the FOMC’s monetary-policy designs and caused some FOMC members to
express their dissatisfaction with intervention by dissenting on related issues.  At times, the
Federal Reserve refused to intervene for its own account and only executed interventions for the
U.S. Treasury’s account.  These examples suggest that if one believes that intervention always
acts as a monetary-policy signal, then it has created as much uncertainty about monetary policy
and confusion about the strength of Committee’s commitment to price stability than it has cleared
away.  Fatama and Hutchison (1999) show that intervention adds to volatility in the federal funds
futures market.  This suggests that intervention can increase the difficulties associated with
implementing monetary policies.
Intervention could provide much more information than hints about future monetary
policy moves.  In general, however, the empirical literature on sterilized intervention suggests
that it is largely ineffective.  Humpage (1999, 2000), for example, found that the probability of a
successful U.S. intervention was low—less than one-half of all cases.  When it seemed
successful, intervention tended only to slow rates of appreciation or depreciation; it did not alter
the direction of an exchange-rate movement.  Hence, sterilized intervention cannot cause a
depreciating currency to appreciate.  Successful interventions were also concentrated in periods
of extreme uncertainty, such as after the October 1987 stock-market crash or immediately after
the 1985 Plaza Accord.6
Nonsterilized Intervention and Monetary Policy.
As Furlong (1989) illustrates, the FOMC on rare occasion has adjusted its monetary-
policy stance in response to movements in the dollar’s exchange value.  Other central banks have
done likewise.  This section addresses problems that arise when a central bank simultaneously
pursues a price-level and an exchange-rate objective with a single policy instrument.  We show
that a central bank must compromise these objectives in all cases, except when the underlying
economic shock is domestic in origin and monetary in nature.  The central bank then loses some
credibility and creates uncertainty with respect to both of these objectives.  How much inflation
will it accept to avoid a further exchange-rate appreciation?  How big of an appreciation will it
accept to avoid inflation?
Our simple model considers only one time period.
6  We allow for two countries (the
domestic nation and the rest of the world), each of which is endowed with a single good, which it
either consumes or trades with the other country.  Both countries have central banks, which create
money for transactions purposes.  By setting the money supply equal to a simple transactions
demand for real cash balances and by taking the logarithmic first differences of the variables, we
derive following expressions for inflation in both countries:
1) e y m    + − = π
2)
∗ ∗ ∗ − = y m   π
In equation 1, π is the domestic inflation rate; m  is domestic money growth;  y  is domestic real
output growth, and e is a domestic money-supply shock.  Equation 2 contains similar terms with
asterisks for the foreign country.  As these equations indicate, inflation results when the money
stock expands faster than the public’s money demand.
We assume that individuals hold only domestic money balances but allow them to
instantaneously exchange domestic currency for foreign currency at the market exchange rate to
                                                
6  See Turnovsky (1997) for a short review of these types of models and for further references.7
buy the foreign good.  Following Stockman (1987), the logarithmic first difference of the nominal
exchange rate, s , equals the logarithmic first difference of the real exchange rate, r , plus the
difference between inflation abroad and at home:
3) π π − + =
∗ r s   .
The nominal exchange rate is the price of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency,
that is, the number of foreign currency units that trade for one domestic currency unit.  In our
model, the real exchange rate, r, equals the terms of trade, which is expressed in units of exports
per unit of import.
7   As equation 3 indicates, nominal exchange-rate variations reflect either
changes in the relative price of traded goods, differences between the domestic and foreign
inflation rates, or both.
Substituting equations 1 and 2 into equation 3 shows how the nominal exchange rate
responds to changes in either countries’ money demand or money supply:
4) ) ( ) ( e y m y m r s        + − − − + =
∗ ∗ .
If the foreign country generates a higher rate of excessive money growth than the domestic
country, the domestic currency will appreciate.  Likewise, the domestic currency will depreciate
if excessive money growth at home outpaces that abroad.
We assume that the objective of domestic monetary policy is to maintain a zero rate of
inflation, minimize variation in the exchange rate, or achieve some optimal combination of both
objectives.
















where A is the relative weight attached to the exchange-rate objective.  A may range from 0 to
infinity, where 0 implies that the domestic central bank only cares about inflation and infinity
                                                
7  In models with both traded and nontraded goods the relative price of trade to nontraded goods will also affect the real
exchange rate.8
implies that it cares only about exchange-rate volatility.  In any case, the domestic central bank
always chooses a monetary growth rate (m  ) that minimizes its loss function.  This yields the
following optimal money-growth rule:
6)   () e y y m r
A
A











If the domestic central bank ignores exchange-rate volatility ( 0 = A ), it will supply just enough
money to satisfy the demand for money and to offset any random money-supply shocks.
9  As the
weight that the domestic central bank assigns to exchange-rate volatility rises, real-exchange-rate
changes and excess foreign monetary growth will become relatively more important factors in
determining the optimal monetary-growth rate than the growth in the domestic demand for money
and shocks to the money-supply.
When the domestic central bank acts follows the optimal money growth rule (equation 6),
the inflation rate is given by:
7) ) (
1







= y m r
A
A    π ,


























s     .
We obtain equations 7 and 8 by substituting equation 6 back into equations 1 and 2.  If the





, the domestic inflation rate
becomes zero, since the domestic central bank only sets money growth to accommodate domestic
money-demand growth or to offset money-supply shocks.  In this case, the nominal exchange rate
will fluctuate one-for-one with changes in the real exchange rate and with changes in excessive
                                                                                                                                                
8  We assume that the foreign central bank, which represents the rest of the world, does not operate so as to minimize a
obvious loss function.  Footnote 10 discusses the results, if we allowed the foreign central bank to minimize a similar
loss function.9





approaches 1 and  0 = s  .  In this case, changes in the real exchange rate and
excessive money growth abroad will determine the domestic inflation rate.  These results are
standard in the literature on the relative merits of fixed and floating exchange rates.  Bretton
Woods, for example, broke down because the United States generated an inflation rate that many
European countries found excessively high.  Floating exchange rates allow countries to determine
their own inflation rates independently.
Most countries, however, seem to care both about eliminating inflation and about
minimizing exchange-rate variations.  Within the context of our model, they choose a value of A
somewhere between the extremes.  In doing so, however, they establish the potential for conflict
between price and exchange rate stability.  To illustrate the problem, we will consider a domestic
money-supply shock, excessive foreign money growth, and changes in the real exchange rate.
Domestic money supply shock
Our one-period model (equations 7 and 8) suggests that domestic money-supply shocks
have no effect on the domestic inflation rate or on the nominal exchange rate when the domestic
central bank acts optimally.  By stretching the model’s timing conventions, however, we can
show that domestic monetary shocks never create a conflict between policy objectives.  Assume
that a money-supply shock ( 0 > e  ) occurs at the opening of the period.  Absent an offsetting
change in monetary policy, this shock will cause domestic inflation to increase (equation 1) and
will cause the domestic currency to depreciate (equation 3).  By offsetting the money supply
shock, the domestic central bank promotes both price, and exchange-rate stability.  A similar
result would follow from a domestic money-demand shock.  In general, when the shock affecting
the economy is domestic in origin and monetary in nature, an offsetting monetary-policy response
                                                                                                                                                
9  Shocks to the money supply might emanate from changes in banks’ holding of excess reserves or from
changes in the public’s currency holdings.10
can simultaneously achieve both objectives.  This unfortunately is the only case in which a
conflict between the monetary-policy objectives does not result, as our remaining examples
illustrate.
Foreign excess money growth
If the shock affecting the exchange market stems from a change in foreign excess money
growth—either a change in 
∗ m  or in 
∗ y  —an attempt to stabilize the exchange rate comes at the
expense of price stability and vice versa.  Assume that foreign money growth accelerates beyond
what is necessary to accommodate foreign money demand.  This causes an increase in the foreign
rate of inflation and a depreciation of the foreign currency ( 0 > s  in equation 8).  Excess foreign
money growth has no direct effect on domestic prices in our model, but if the domestic central
bank attempts to prevent an appreciation of the domestic currency ( 0 ≠ A ) by increasing the
domestic money supply, it will then also cause an increase in the domestic rate of inflation.
Achieving the exchange-rate objective comes at the expense of the inflation target when the
underlying shock is foreign in origin and monetary in nature.
10
An Increase in the Supply of Home Goods
Although the model does not directly specify the types of events that will change the real
exchange rate, any change in either the supply or demand for domestic or foreign goods will alter
it.  An increase in the productivity of domestic workers, for example, would increase the supply
of the domestic good and lower its price relative to the price of foreign output.  Real and nominal
depreciations (equation 3) would follow from this relative price change.
In addition to this relative-price effect, the productivity-induced increase in real output
would simultaneously increase the demand for real money balances.  Ignoring temporarily our
assumption about the optimal behavior of the domestic central bank, the domestic inflation rate
                                                
10  If the foreign central bank reacts to the same loss function as the domestic central bank, then foreign nominal
variables drop out of the equations for the optimal money supply, the inflation rate, and the change in the nominal
exchange rate, but the real exchange rate remains an argument in each of these equations.  A coordinated response does
not eliminate the problems associated with maintaining an exchange-rate objective for monetary policy.11
would fall as money demand increased, and the nominal exchange rate would appreciate (see
equation 3).  In the absence of an optimal monetary response, the combined relative-price and
money-demand effects stemming from an exogenous increase in the supply of domestic goods
will reduce the domestic inflation rate, but it will have an ambiguous effect on the exchange
rate.
11
If, however, we continue to assume that the central bank responds optimally, the
domestic inflation rate will fall and the domestic exchange rate will depreciate.  Both of these
results obtain because the domestic central bank, in attempting to achieve both objectives by
adjusting the money supply, will supply less money than is necessary to fully accommodate the
increase in domestic money demand, but this action will induce a nominal exchange-rate
depreciation.   In general, when the economic shock is real in nature and domestic in origin,
policy must negotiate a trade-off between price and exchange-rate stability.
An Increase in the Supply of Foreign Goods
For much the same reason, an increase in the supply of foreign goods could also create a
policy conflict if the domestic central bank attempts to maintain both price and exchange-rate
stability.  An increase in foreign supply would lower the relative price of the foreign good and
thereby alter both the real and nominal exchange rates.  If the domestic central bank attempts to
offset the appreciation of its currency through an increase in the domestic money supply, it
generates a higher rate of inflation.  Nonsterilized intervention is not compatible with both
objectives when the shock is foreign in origin and real in nature.
The foregoing examples suggest that only when the underlying shock is domestic in
origin and monetary in nature will nonsterilized intervention be compatible with both price and
exchange-rate stability.  In all of the other examples, nonsterilized intervention did not achieve
both objectives at the same time, and the domestic central bank must compromise one or both of
its policy goals.  Such compromises could reduce the central bank’s credibility for attaining these
                                                
11 On this point, see Stockman (1987).12
objects.  A central bank that has a stated price objective weakens its commitment to that objective
when it also alters policy in response to exchange-rate volatility.
On the Redundancy of Nonsterilized Intervention
Most countries, nevertheless, seem to manage some trade-off between exchange-rate and
price stability apparently with no deleterious effect on their central bank’s credibility for price
stability.  As already noted, the Federal Reserve has on occasion adjusted its monetary policy
stance with an exchange market objective in mind, and it has sometimes intervened in the foreign
exchange market while altering its federal funds target (see Humpage 1999).  Whether one refers
to such interventions as nonsterilized or as a combination of a sterilized intervention in
conjunction with a monetary policy change is inconsequential.  In either case, the intervention is
completely unnecessary since domestic open-market operations alone can achieve the same
objective.
One might expect that implementing such a policy change through the purchase or sale of
foreign currency would have a bigger exchange-rate response than purchasing or selling domestic
Treasury securities, but two recent empirical studies suggest otherwise.  Using an event-study
methodology, Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) show that federal-funds-rate-target changes are correlated
significantly with changes in the spot German mark–U.S. dollar exchange rate and with changes
in the Japanese yen–U.S. dollar forward premiums.  Intervention undertaken in conjunction with
the federal-funds-rate-target changes, however, has no apparent effect on exchange rates, even
though the researchers cumulate it over the previous two weeks.  We obtained essentially the
same results when we repeated their experiment for the spot German mark and Japanese yen
exchange rates, and when we extended their sample period somewhat (see Table 1).  Unlike the
original study, we do not cumulate intervention.  Instead, we assume the market incorporates any
information associated with intervention almost immediately.  This change, however, makes no
difference to the results.  In Bonser-Neal et al. and in our extension of their work, intervention
adds nothing to a change in the federal funds target.13
In their study, Bonser-Neal et al. consider only the two-day exchange-rate response
surrounding changes in the federal funds target, and they include intervention only if it is roughly
contemporary with the change in the federal funds target.  They do not consider the exchange-rate
response to intervention when the federal funds target is unchanged.  Humpage (1999) does just
the opposite.  He considers only exchange-rate movements immediately around intervention
episodes and includes only those changes in the federal funds target that occur
contemporaneously with the intervention.  He estimates the probability of an intervention’s
success, allowing for the size of the intervention, whether or not it is coordinated, and for
adjustments in the federal funds target.  His estimates show that when a change in the federal
funds rate accompanies an intervention, the combined operation is virtually certain to affect
exchange rates.  The equations, however, indicate that a changes of in the federal funds rate target
alone guarantees success; as in the Bonser-Neal et al., intervention did not exert a separate
influence on exchange rates.
Policy Implications
Sterilized intervention does not provide a central bank with a means of systematically
influencing its exchange rates independently of its monetary policy.  In general, attempts to
achieve exchange-rate objectives will either prove ineffective or will succeed at the risk of
possibly compromising the bank’s credibility with respect to price stability.  Central banks may
find this risk worth taking from time to time, and our conclusions do not dispute this point.  They
do suggest, however, that transacting in foreign exchange—and maintaining a large open position
in foreign exchange for that purpose—is wholly unnecessary.  Convention instruments of
monetary policy are sufficient to achieve exchange-rate objectives.14
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Table 1:  Two-Day Exchange Rate Response to Federal-Fund-Target-Rate Change








Observations 51 51 59 59
Dependent
variable
DM per $ Yen per $ DM per $ Yen per $
Constant -0.2516* 0.0325 -0.2311* 0.0157
(0.1267) (0.0840) (0.1170) (0.0878)
Federal funds
target
 0.8720** -0.2457 0.72947* -0.3305
(0.4498) (0.2444) (0.4160) (0.2538)
Intervention -0.0026 0.0001 -0.0026 0.0001
(0.0026) (0.0008) (0.0025) (0.0009)
2 R 0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.02
Q-statistic p-
value
0.897 0.991 0.942 0.272
Note:  We measured exchange-rate changes from the day before to the day after a federal-funds-
target (FFT) change:   ) ln( 100 1 1 − + ⋅ = ∆ t t S S S where S is foreign currency units per dollar.  A
federal-funds-target change is measured as:  1 − − = ∆ t t FFT FFT FFT .  Bonser-Neal et al. (1998)
estimate their equations from October 28, 1987, through November 15, 1994.  We extend the
sample through December 31, 1998.  On three days, consecutive changes in the federal funds
target appear in the sample data.  Whereas, Bonser-Neal et al. delete these from their data set, we
include them.  We measure intervention on day t.  Cumulating intervention over the previous ten
days, as in Bonser-Neal et al., made no difference to the results.  Estimated standard errors appear
in parentheses.  Single and double asterisks indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.  The p-value for the Q-statistic refers to a test for first-degree autocorrelations.
Regressions for the German mark-U.S. dollar exchange rates are adjusted for first-order
autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.  German mark-U.S. dollar regressions
showed no higher-order autocorrelation.  Japanese yen-U.S. dollar regressions exhibited no
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